Deliberate Indifference or Not: That Is the Question in the Third Circuit Jail Suicide Case of Woloszyn v. Lawrence County by Scarafile, Shevon I.
Volume 51 Issue 5 Article 7 
2006 
Deliberate Indifference or Not: That Is the Question in the Third 
Circuit Jail Suicide Case of Woloszyn v. Lawrence County 
Shevon I. Scarafile 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shevon I. Scarafile, Deliberate Indifference or Not: That Is the Question in the Third Circuit Jail Suicide 
Case of Woloszyn v. Lawrence County, 51 Vill. L. Rev. 1133 (2006). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/7 
This Issues in the Third Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger 
School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor 
of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2006]
"DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" OR NOT: THAT IS THE QUESTION
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT JAIL SUICIDE CASE OF
WOLOSZYN v. LAWRENCE COUNTY
"An individual incarcerated ... becomes vulnerable and depen-
dent upon the state to provide certain simple and basic human
needs."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Suicide 2 is one of the leading causes of death in jails3 across the
United States.4 In 1983, suicide accounted for 56% of the deaths that oc-
curred in jails.5 Moreover, from 1994 to 1996, the suicide rate in county
1. Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972).
2. Suicide, as defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, is "[t]he act or an
instance of intentionally killing oneself." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 811 (3d
ed. 1994) (defining suicide).
3. Ajail, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary, is "[a] local government's deten-
tion center where persons awaiting trial or those convicted of misdemeanors are
confined." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 851 (8th ed. 2004) (defining jail). A prison,
on the other hand, is defined as "[a] state or federal facility of confinement for
convicted criminals, esp. felons." Id. at 1232 (defining prison).
4. See Karen L. Cropsey, Suicide in Jails and Prisons: What the Numbers Tell Us, 7
UDC/DCSL L. REv. 213, 213 (2002) (highlighting fact that suicide is, at time of
publication of article, third leading cause of death, behind natural causes and
AIDS); see also Lindsay M. Hayes, Suicide in Adult Correctional Facilities: Key Ingredients
to Prevention and Overcoming the Obstacles, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 260, 260 (1999)
(emphasizing that suicide in jails is "public health problem" and that at time of
publication, suicide was leading cause of death in jails).
5. See CHRISTOPHERJ. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE
IN STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS 1 (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/shsplj.pdf (summarizing data from Bureau of Justice Statistics data collection
that collected death records from all local jails in 2000 and all state prisons in
2001). The Bureau ofJustice Statistics ("BJS") began to collect data to comply with
the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2000. See id. at 1 (reporting purpose of
study). The first report included data from 2000 to 2002 and highlighted both
suicide and homicide statistics in local jails and state prisons. See id. (same); see also
James E. Robertson, Fatal Custody: A Reassessment of Section 1983 Liability for Custodial
Suicide, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 807, 807-08 (1993) ("Suicide is the leading cause of
death of prisoners."); Christy P. Johnson, Comment, Mental Health Care Policies in
Jail Systems: Suicide and the Eighth Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1227, 1228
(2002) ("Suicide is the leading cause of death in jails nationwide."). It is important
to note that the difference between local jails and state prisons is that local jails
hold unsentenced offenders, also known as pretrial detainees, offenders sentenced
to a year or less and offenders awaiting transfer to state prisons whereas state pris-
ons hold offenders who have been convicted and sentenced for more than one
year. See MUMOLA, supra (distinguishing between local jails and state prisons).
State prisons have always had lower suicide rates than localjails. See id. at 2 ("State
prison suicide rates have historically been much lower than those ofjails."); see also
Susan D. Fahey, Jailhouse Suicides-Where is the Abuse of Power?, 14 Miss. C. L. REv.
(1133)
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jails was nine times greater than that of the general population. 6 In 2002,
however, the latest year for which there is data, the suicide rate in jails
dropped to a third of what the rate was in 1983-47 suicides per 100,000
inmates7 in 2002, compared to 129 suicides per 100,000 inmates in 1983.8
In spite of the decrease in suicides over the last twenty years, the suicides
that do occur today share similar characteristics. 9 For example, the major-
ity of suicide victims are pretrial detainees ° as opposed to convicted pris-
oners."1 Most suicide victims also tend to be young, unmarried, Caucasian
males arrested for the first time, either intoxicated or under the influence
of drugs, who usually kill themselves within the first twenty-four hours of
imprisonment. 12
77, 79 (1993) (noting that in Mississippi, out of forty-six total suicides, only four
occurred in state prisons while forty-two occurred in local jails).
6. See Suicide Screening/Prevention 1 (2003), http://www.tcleose.state.tx.us/
GuideInst/bc3/approved-l-105/15.%20suicide%20screening%20&%20preven-
tion.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (distinguishing suicide rate in county jails from
that of general population); see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 808 (noting that
suicide in jails occurs at rate "several times" greater than in general public); John-
son, supra note 5, at 1228 ("The jailhouse suicide rate is nine times greater than
that of the general civilian population."). But see MUMOLA, supra note 5, at 2
(presenting data that indicated that even if suicide rate in jails was higher than in
general population, that from 1983 to 1993, suicide rate was cut by more than half
(129 suicides per 100,000 inmates in 1983 to 54 suicides per 100,000 inmates in
1993)).
7. An inmate is "[a] person confined in a prison, hospital, or other institu-
tion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 803 (defining inmate). In this
Casebrief, inmate will be used to refer to both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners.
8. See MuMOLA, supra note 5, at 2 (comparing suicide statistics in jails).
9. For a further discussion of the common characteristics of jail suicides, see
infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. See THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER'S HANDBOOK: How TO BRING A FEDERAL LAW-
SUIT TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF YOUR RIGHTS IN PRISON 27 (Center for Constitu-
tional Rights & The National Lawyer's Guild eds., 4th ed. 2003) (1974), available at
http://www.nlg.org/resources/JLHFinal.pdf (defining pretrial detainee as person
who was incarcerated in jail but who was not yet convicted). Because pretrial de-
tainees have not been convicted, conditions in jails for pretrial detainees are re-
viewed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. (distinguish-
ing between pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners); see also George J. Franks,
The Conundrum of Federal Jail Suicide Case Law Under Section 1983 and Its Double Bind
forJailAdministrators, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 117, 120-21 (1993) (noting that pre-
trial detainees' rights are evaluated under Fourteenth Amendment).
11. See Fahey, supra note 5, at 79 (contemplating that this difference between
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners is result of better training on state level,
over-crowding in local facilities, structures in local facilities, like metal bars and
pipes that are accessible for pretrial detainees to commit suicide with and fact that
local pretrial detainees are usually drunk when arrested).
12. See Hayes, supra note 4, at 260 (reciting characteristics ofjail suicides in-
cluding statistic that victims are normally found hanging by their bedding or cloth-
ing); see, e.g., Suicide Screening/Prevention, supra note 6, at 2 (listing other
characteristics ofjail suicides such as prior suicide by close family member, mental
illness, isolation and/or recent loss); see also Cropsey, supra note 4, at 214-15 (dis-
1134 [Vol. 51: p. 1133
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The suicide of any individual, especially a pretrial detainee whose
every need is dependent upon the jail, is a tragedy.1 3 When pretrial de-
tainees commit suicide, their estates often want to hold someone liable.1 4
Thus, the estate has the option of suing the jail's custodial officers-either
in their individual or official capacity-the jail's warden, and/or the mu-
nicipality, pursuant to Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code
("Section 1983").15 Indeed, Section 1983 permits individuals to sue a gov-
ernmental entity for violating a constitutional right.16
Even though pretrial detainees are guaranteed a safe and protective
custodial setting and the right to adequate medical care, custodial officials
cannot guarantee that those in their custody will not commit suicide. 17 As
a result, to hold individual custodial officers liable for a pretrial detainee's
suicide, the United States Supreme Court and most federal courts have
chosen the "deliberate indifference" standard.1 8 To prove "deliberate in-
tinguishingjail suicides from prison suicides because prison suicides often involve
older men who suffer from mental disorder, who are serving longer sentences and
who wait four to five years to kill themselves); Robertson, supra note 5, at 808-09
(comparing characteristics of pretrial detainees who commit suicide to general
public and quoting one researcher as saying "'[y]ou might say that our jails are
testing the suicide potential of a suicide-prone group'").
13. See, e.g., Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972) (describ-
ing how those incarcerated in prisons and jails depend upon custodial officials to
meet their human needs).
14. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 1229-30 (arguing that in context of con-
victed prisoners, estate sues jail's municipality pursuant to Section 1983 and alleges
violation of Eighth Amendment).
15. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2006) (setting forth text of statute); see also
Franks, supra note 10, at 118 (describing how Section 1983 lawsuit can be brought
against both individuals and governmental entities and how constitutional depriva-
tion must be alleged). Section 1983 was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 and its purpose was to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shari S.
Weinman, Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: Searching for the Deep
Pocket, 56 Mo. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (1991) (reciting history of statute). For a further
discussion of Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, see infra notes 29-
37 and accompanying text.
16. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at 1229 ("Section 1983 is the general provision
that allows individuals to sue government entities for constitutional violations.");
see also Fahey, supra note 5, at 78 (emphasizing that Section 1983 is designed to
prevent governmental abuse of power). For a further discussion of Section 1983
litigation, see infra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
17. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. (Colburn 1), 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir.
1988) (" [C] ustodial officials cannot be placed in the position of guaranteeing that
inmates will not commit suicide."), rev'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1991); see also Fahey, supra note 5, at 83 (discussing that inmates who are "stripped
of all means of self-defense" are guaranteed safe custodial place but that with cus-
todial suicide mere negligence is not enough). But cf Hayes, supra note 4, at 260
("A robotic state of mind excuse, that inmate suicide is not preventable, impedes
prevention efforts.").
18. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (establishing standard for
Eighth Amendment prisoner rights claims that Supreme Court extended to pre-
trial detainees); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that pretrial detainees' constitutional rights are violated when prison officials act
with "deliberate indifference"); Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956
2006] 1135
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difference" in Section 1983 litigation, the plaintiff must show that the cus-
todial officers knew of the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide and
did not affirmatively act to prevent the suicide. 19 Proponents of the "de-
liberate indifference" standard argue that the standard is reasonable be-
cause it is not feasible to expect that all suicides would be prevented and
that if the standard was mere negligence, litigation would erupt.2 Oppo-
nents of the standard argue that it is too narrowly tailored, too difficult to
meet and that with proper training programs, almost all jail suicides can
be prevented. 2 1 Due to the demanding nature of the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard, plaintiffs in these cases rarely prevail.
22
Despite the circuit courts' wide acceptance of the "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has neither strictly adopted it as the standard for proving Section 1983
liability in the case of pretrial detainee suicides nor strictly defined the
(lst Cir. 1992) ("[W]hen liability for serious harm or death, including suicide, is at
issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference .... "); Rellergert v.
Cape Girardeau County, 924 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that "deliber-
ate indifference" is difficult standard and if inmate's estate cannot demonstrate it,
estate will lose); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring "de-
liberate indifference" for constitutional violations against pretrial detainees as well
as convicted prisoners); Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th
Cir. 1990) ("Because jail suicides are analogous to the failure to provide medical
care, deliberate indifference has become the barometer by which suicide cases in-
volving convicted prisoners as well as pretrial detainees are tested."); Danese v.
Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing that pretrial detainees'
rights are violated if prison officials exhibit "deliberate indifference" to pretrial
detainees' medical needs); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d
1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that "deliberate indifference" standard applies
in context ofjail suicide); see also Franks, supra note 10, at 122-23 (explaining that
"deliberate indifference" standard requires "strong likelihood" that suicide would
occur and in jail suicide cases, most discussion revolves around inadequate jail
screening procedures). For a further discussion of the development of the "delib-
erate indifference" standard, see infra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
19. For a further and in-depth discussion of the "deliberate indifference"
standard, see infra notes 29-78, 115-40 and accompanying text.
20. See Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 669 (discussing how it is impossible for custodial
officials to prevent all suicides); see also Fahey, supra note 5, at 77-78 (noting that
jail suicide litigation has exploded recently and that if standard for liability is negli-
gence, Section 1983 would then be designed to "federalize state tort principles").
21. See Franks, supra note 10, at 121-22 (discussing how it is virtually impossi-
ble for plaintiff in jail suicide case to win because plaintiff has to demonstrate that
official or governmental entity had obvious knowledge of suicidal risk); Robertson,
supra note 5, at 829-30 (arguing that suicide is not "inevitable aspect of incarcera-
tion" and that federal courts have "narrowly defined constitutional duty to safe-
guard inmates").
22. See Franks, supra note 10, at 121 (theorizing that pretrial detainee plain-
tiffs do not prevail in jail suicide cases because "[t]here is a tension inherent be-
tween regulating the conduct of the governmental entity versus making the jail
and jailers per se liable for the safety of the inmates"). But see Fahey, supra note 5,
at 78 (asserting that Section 1983 is for abuse of governmental power and not
"designed to federalize state tort principles," thus, standard should not be negli-
gence and it should be difficult to prevail).
1136 [Vol. 51: p. 1133
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standard when discussing it in cases. 23 In light of the precedents from the
United States Supreme Court, the Third Circuit will most likely choose
"deliberate indifference" when faced with the task of defining the
standard.
24
To explain this likelihood, Part II of this Casebrief discusses both Su-
preme Court precedent and Third Circuit precedent regarding Section
1983 liability for pretrial detainee suicides. 25 Part III details the facts, the
procedural posture and the Third Circuit's analysis in the most recent pre-
trial detainee suicide case, Woloszyn v. County of Lawrrence.26 Part IV
predicts how the Third Circuit will most likely define the Section 1983
pretrial detainee standard in the future, as well as factors that lawyers in
the Third Circuit should consider when litigating these cases. 2 7 Part V
concludes with a brief summary of why the Third Circuit should adopt the
"deliberate indifference" standard. 2
8
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 1983 and Supreme Court Precedent
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code 29 permits individu-
als to recover damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. 3 0 To
23. For a further discussion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit precedent regarding the standard for liability of a pretrial detainee
suicide, see infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit will most likely adopt this
rendition, see infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the background of Section 1983 liability for
pretrial detainee suicides, see infra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
26. 396 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2005). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit
case Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, see infra notes 79-114 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of what standard the Third Circuit will most likely
select and suggestions for Third Circuit practitioners, see infra notes 115-35 and
accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit should select "deliberate
indifference" as the standard, see infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2006). The current language reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id. (setting forth exact language of statute).
30. See Weinman, supra note 15, at 1042 ("[S]ection 1983 would become the
principal means by which plaintiffs could hold governmental officials accountable
for the deprivation of constitutional rights.").
11372006] CASEBR1EF
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state a claim under Section 1983, an individual must allege a violation of a
federally protected right by someone acting "under the color of state
law."3 1 "Under the color of state law" refers to individuals who work for
the state and thus have their authority as a result of state law.3 2 Individuals
can recover damages from governmental officials either in their individual
or official capacity. 33 Individuals can also recover from municipalities be-
cause they are considered individuals for the purposes of Section 1983. 3 4
Municipalities can be sued for the unconstitutional implementation of a
policy or custom 35 or the failure to train governmental employees.3 6 A
claim for failure to train governmental employees, however, is actionable
31. See AndrewJ. Schwartz, Section 1983 Authorizes Municipal Liability for Failure
to Train Employees in Limited Circumstances, City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197
(1989), 20 SETON HALL L. REv. 886, 886 (1990) ("Section 1983 provides a federal
civil remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights are violated 'under color
of' state law.").
32. See Weinman, supra note 15, at 1042 ("The Court clarified the meaning of
'under color of state law' . . . as '[in]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law
and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law' .... ).
33. See Franks, supra note 10, at 118-19 ("A public official may not be held
personally liable unless a clearly established constitutional right is violated or the
fact situation suggests that the public official might reasonably believe that he or
she violated a ... constitutional right. .. ").
34. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that
Congress intended for municipalities and other local governmental entities to be
encompassed in definition of "persons" under Section 1983). The United States
Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services also noted that a municipal-
ity cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, meaning that under
Section 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable for the constitutional violations
of its employees. See id. at 691 (explaining that only time municipalities should be
held liable under Section 1983 is when municipalities engaged in constitutional
tort, not when its employees did). In Monell, female plaintiffs brought a class ac-
tion lawsuit against the Department of Social Services, the Board of Education of
New York, the city, the mayor and other individuals alleging that the governmental
entities and individuals forced pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence
before it was "medically necessary to do so." See id. at 660-61 (setting forth facts of
case). The Supreme Court ruled on the issues of whether local governmental offi-
cials sued in their official capacity and municipalities were "persons" under Section
1983. See id. at 662 (listing issues in case).
35. See id. at 690-91 (describing how governmental entities, such as municipal-
ities, can be sued where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional imple-
ments or executes a policy statement .. .officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers" or where constitutional deprivation results from governmental
"custom").
36. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that mu-
nicipality could be liable if employee's inadequate training results in "deliberate
indifference" to person's constitutional rights). In City of Canton v. Harris, the
plaintiff was arrested by the defendants, city police officers, and following the ar-
rest, she fell repeatedly rendering her incoherent. See id. at 381 (setting forth
plaintiff's injury). Despite this, the officers did not request medical assistance and
as a result, following her release from jail, she was diagnosed with emotional ill-
nesses that required hospitalization. See id. (laying foundation for plaintiff's claim
against city police officers). Plaintiff filed suit against the city under Section 1983
alleging that the city's failure to train its police officers violated her constitutional
1138 [Vol. 51: p. 1133
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only when "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come in contact."
37
In the context of prisoners, Section 1983 protects several rights that
prisoners are guaranteed to have, including the right to adequate medical
care. 38 In Estelle v. Gamble,3 9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment is violated if there is "deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] seri-
ous medical needs."40 The Supreme Court extended the right to medical
care to pretrial detainees in 1983 in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital.41 One major difference, however, between convicted prisoners
right to necessary medical attention. See id. at 381, 386 n.5 (reciting plaintiff's
claim).
The Supreme Court held that a failure to train police can be a basis for hold-
ing a municipality liable under Section 1983 but that the failure to train has to
amount to "deliberate indifference." See id. at 388 (reciting holding of case); see
also Anne Elizabeth Albers, Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 for
Failure to Train: Michigan Municipalities are Stripped of Immunity, Rushing v. Wayne
County, 8 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 703, 707 (1991) (summarizing Harris and noting
that it was not until this case that Supreme Court adequately defined municipal
liability under Section 1983).
37. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 (citing standard for failure to train claim); see
also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. ("Colburn I"), 946 F.2d 1017, 1028 (3d Cir.
1991) (citing "deliberate indifference" standard as standard for municipal liability
under Section 1983).
38. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) ("An inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce
physical 'torture or a lingering death' . . .
39. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
40. See id. at 106 (emphasizing that negligence in diagnosing or treating con-
dition does not qualify as lack of adequate medical care or as cruel and unusual
punishment). In Estelle v. Gamble, the convicted prisoner suffered an injury as a
result of prison work and despite the plethora of medication he was put on, the
prison officials brought him before the disciplinary committee several times for
not completing his work. See id. at 98-101 (reciting facts of case). In addition, on
several occasions, the plaintiff alleged that he asked the guards if he could see a
doctor and on two occasions they refused. See id. at 101 (same). After four
months, the plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment. See id. (describing plaintiff's cause of action). The Supreme
Court held that the appropriate standard to prove a violation of the Eighth
Amendment was the "deliberate indifference" standard and that the plaintiff in
this case did not meet the standard because he had been treated on seventeen
separate occasions by the physician on duty. See id. at 107 (reciting holding of
case).
41. 463 U.S. 239 (1983). In City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, a
suspect was shot and wounded by a city police officer while he was fleeing the
scene of a breaking and entering. See id. at 240-42 (delineating facts of case). The
suspect was brought to Massachusetts General Hospital and treated for nine days
and upon release, he was arrested and arraigned. See id. at 240-41 (same). The
hospital sent the City of Revere the bill for the medical expenses and Revere re-
fused to pay it. See id. at 241 (same). The Supreme Court held that even though
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires governmental en-
tities to provide medical care to detained persons, the United States Constitution
does not provide for how the medical care is paid for but rather that is left up to
20061 CASEBRIEF 1139
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and pretrial detainees in the Section 1983 context is that the latter's as-
serted constitutional claim for lack of adequate medical care falls under
the Fourteenth Amendment 4 2 rather than the Eighth Amendment.43 De-
spite this difference, the "deliberate indifference" standard in Supreme
Court cases applies in cases involving both convicted prisoners and pre-
trial detainees.
4 4
What Estelle and City of Revere did not address, however, was what con-
stituted "deliberate indifference" and whether "serious medical needs" in-
cluded suicidal vulnerability. 45 The Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan
46
elaborated on the "deliberate indifference" standard in the Eighth
Amendment context, stating that a custodial official is not liable "unless
the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference." 4 7 Thus, in order to impose liability for a con-
state law. See id. at 245-46 ("[T]he injured detainee's constitutional right is to re-
ceive the needed medical treatment; how the city of Revere obtains such treatment
is not a federal constitutional question."); see also Franks, supra note 10, at 120-21
(noting that pretrial detainee's rights are similar to those of convicted prisoner
and encompass right to adequate medical care).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....").
43. Id. at amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see Revere, 463 U.S.
at 244 ("'Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has com-
plied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal pros-
ecutions .... [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish.., until after it
has secured a formal adjudication of guilt ... ' (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977))); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101 (noting that with
convicted prisoners their claim is violation of Eighth Amendment, made applica-
ble to states by Fourteenth Amendment); Amanda A. Johnson & Megan Geunther,
Prisoners' Rights, 90 GEo. L.J. 2005, 204243 (2002) ("The Due Process Clause
[rather than the Eighth Amendment] prohibits punishment of pretrial detainees
and protects them from excessive force that amounts to punishment."); THE JAiL-
HOUSE LAWYER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 27 (indicating that Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment for convicted prisoners and because
pretrial detainees have not been convicted, they cannot be punished, and thus,
pretrial detainees' claims are reviewed under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause and not Eighth Amendment).
44. See Franks, supra note 10, at 121 ("Since a jail suicide is considered a sub-
set of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the test is identical for
pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners.").
45. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 814 ("[T]he Estelle Court failed to define
'deliberate indifference' or indicate whether 'serious medical needs' encompassed
the risk of suicide.").
46. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
47. See id. at 837 (noting that this holding comports best with Eighth Amend-
mentjurisprudence). The Supreme Court noted, however, that one can indirectly
prove a custodial official's knowledge of a risk via circumstantial evidence. See id.
at 842 (elaborating on standard). In Farmer v. Brennan, the petitioner was a male
transsexual who was incarcerated with male prisoners despite his feminine charac-
teristics. See id. at 829-30 (reciting facts of case). At one point in 1989, petitioner
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victed prisoner's suicide, a party has to prove that the custodial official
being sued knew that the prisoner was suicidal and failed to act affirma-
tively to protect the prisoner.4 8 As a result, the inquiry will be extremely
fact sensitive in order to prove what the custodial official knew or did not
know. 49 As for whether the risk of suicide is a "serious medical need," the
circuit courts, including the Fifth Circuit in Partridge v. Two Unknown Police
Officers,5 0 have held that under Section 1983, custodial defendants can be
held liable for an inmate's suicide because inmates' mental health is just as
important as their physical health. 5 1 The Third Circuit, in addition to the
Fifth Circuit, was one of the first circuits to find that suicide is a "serious
medical need" encompassed within the right to adequate medical care.
5 2
B. Third Circuit Section 1983 Precedent
In analyzing jail suicide cases involving pretrial detainees, the Third
Circuit has tried to logically delineate factors based on the Supreme
Court's aforementioned precedent and the "deliberate indifference" stan-
was transferred to a penitentiary and despite initial segregation was placed again in
the general population. See id. at 830 (same). After two weeks, petitioner com-
plained of being both beaten and raped and subsequently filed an action against
the wardens and directors of both prisons, among other people, for a violation of
his Eighth Amendment right. See id. (same). In this case, the Court remanded to
determine whether the prison officials would be liable under the elaborated stan-
dard. See id. at 848-49 (reciting holding); see also Franks, supra note 10, at 124
(noting that Supreme Court and several circuit courts have required more than
mere negligence to find constitutional violation under Section 1983).
48. See Franks, supra note 10, at 122-23 ("The deliberate indifference standard
of Estelle, as applied to jail suicide cases, has been held to require a strong likeli-
hood rather than a mere possibility that a suicide would occur.").
49. See id. at 119 (emphasizing fact intensiveness of jail suicide cases because
one must prove that public official or governmental entity clearly knew that inmate
was suicidal).
50. 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986). In Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers,
the Houston police arrested a boy for burglary and theft. See id. at 1184 (reciting
facts of case). The boy's father told the police that the boy suffered from mental
problems and that he wore medical bracelets indicating that he suffered a nervous
breakdown. See id. (same). On the way to the jail, the boy slammed his head
against the divider several times and, during booking, the officer noticed that his
medical alert cards indicated that he had mental problems. See id. (same). The
officer placed the boy in solitary confinement and the boy hung himself three
hours later. See id. (same). The family filed a Section 1983 claim against the custo-
dial defendants and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that inmates have a right to
medical care that encompasses the right to psychiatric care, especially when sui-
cidal tendencies are present. See id. at 1187 (reporting holding and reasoning of
case).
51. See Fahey, supra note 5, at 85 ("The Fifth Circuit was the first court of
appeals to address § 1983 liability for jailhouse suicides.").
52. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346-
47 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting two components of serious medical need: first, failure to
treat medical condition will lead to serious suffering, injury or death; second, med-
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dard.53 The Third Circuit first analyzed Section 1983 liability for a pretrial
detainee's suicide in Colburn v. Upper Darby Township5 4 ("Colburn J").55
The Third Circuit in Colburn I held that if custodial officials "know or
should know of the particular vulnerability to suicide of an inmate, then
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on them an obligation not to act
with reckless indifference to that vulnerability."5 6 The court in Colburn I,
however, did not explain what "reckless indifference" meant or why it was
not using the "deliberate indifference" standard from Estelle.57 If there is
or was a distinction between the two standards, the court in Williams v.
Borough of West Chester58 also declined to delineate one, stating that the
terms "deliberate indifference," "reckless indifference," "gross negligence"
and "reckless disregard" should all be used interchangeably to refer to the
same state of mind.5 9
53. For a further discussion of Third Circuit precedent regarding pretrial de-
tainees and jailhouse suicide, see infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
54. 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1991).
55. See Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005)
("We [Third Circuit] first examined liability under § 1983 for such suicides in Col-
burn v. Upper Darby Township.").
56. See Colburn I, 838 F.2d at 669 (agreeing that custodial officials cannot
"guarantee" against pretrial detainee's suicide). In Colburn I, Upper Darby Town-
ship police arrested and searched a girl who was "visibly intoxicated" before plac-
ing her in a jail cell. See id. at 664-65 (reporting facts of case). Even though the
police did not find anything in their search, the girl shot herself four hours later
with a concealed handgun. See id. at 665 (same). The administrator of the girl's
estate filed a Section 1983 claim alleging that the officers recklessly performed the
search and supervision, that there was a lax custom regarding supervision and
monitoring ofjail cells, that there was a lack of training and that this failure led to
the inability of defendants to observe that the detainee was a suicide risk. See id.
(recounting plaintiffs claims). On appeal, the Third Circuit identified the requi-
site standard for Section 1983 pretrial detainee suicide cases and held that the
district court erred in dismissing the complaint against four of the defendants be-
cause the allegations were sufficient enough to state a claim. See id. at 669, 672
(detailing holding of case).
57. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319 (discussing how Estelle defined standard as
"deliberate indifference" whereas Colburn I interpreted standard as "reckless indif-
ference" and how neither case elaborated on those terms).
58. 891 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1989).
59. See id. at 464 n.10 (noting that custodial officials would be liable for pre-
trial detainee's suicide if they acted with "deliberate indifference," that court
would not distinguish between different standards and that "deliberate indiffer-
ence" would be used to "refer to the type of conduct or state of mind described by
these terms collectively"). In Williams v. Borough of West Chester, the detainee was
arrested, along with his brother, after a shoplifting incident and was brought to the
police station where police immediately put him in a cell after he assumed a "com-
bative position" when his handcuffs were removed. See id. at 462 (recounting
facts). The detainee later hung himself by his belt, an item that officers customa-
rily remove from detainees before placing them in their cells. See id. (same). On
appeal, the Third Circuit held that the officers did not know about the detainee's
suicidal tendencies and that neither the dispatcher, who is not responsible for pris-
oners, nor the municipality, were liable for his suicide. See id. at 465-67 (explain-
ing application of Section 1983 test and holding); see also Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 321
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In Colburn v. Upper Darby Township6 ° ("Colburn II"), the Third Circuit
elaborated on the standard for Section 1983 cases involving pretrial de-
tainees who committed suicide. 6' In an effort to clarify Colburn , the
court in Colburn II stated that a detainee has the burden to prove three
elements in a suicide case: "(1) the detainee had a 'particular vulnerability
to suicide,' (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known
of that vulnerability, [and] (3) those officers 'acted with reckless indiffer-
ence' to the detainee's particular vulnerability. '62 Regarding the first re-
quirement, the court explained that a particular vulnerability to suicide
cannot be just a "mere possibility," but rather it has to be a "strong likeli-
hood."63 As for the second condition, the court declared ways that a cus-
todial official would "know" of a detainee's vulnerability to suicide,
including actual knowledge of a serious suicidal threat, past suicidal at-
tempts or a psychiatric diagnosis specifying suicidal tendencies. 64 Moreo-
ver, concerning whether a custodial officer "should have known" about
the suicidal vulnerability, the court emphasized that the vulnerability has
to be "'so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for' preventative action."6 5 Finally, with regard to the "reckless indiffer-
ence" standard versus the "deliberate indifference" standard, the Third
Circuit in Colburn II once again declined to distinguish or define the con-
("We referred to that level of culpability as 'reckless indifference' in Colburn I. In
Williams v. Borough of West Chester... we referred to the heightened culpability that
is required as 'deliberate indifference.' However, we did not elaborate upon those
terms in either case.") (citations omitted).
60. 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991). Colburn II arose because in Colburn I, even
though the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order granting the defen-
dant's motion, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, on remand and after full discovery. See id. at 1020 (explaining procedu-
ral posture of case). As a result, Colburn appealed the summary judgment deci-
sion in favor of the defendant to the Third Circuit. See id. (same).
61. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319 ("We later elaborated upon that standard in
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township ("Colburn II) .... ") (citation omitted).
62. See Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023 (clarifying standard already established in
Colburn 1).
63. See id. at 1024 (examining first condition as analogous to "degree of risk"
inherent in detainee's actions or conditions); see also Robertson, supra note 5, at
816-17 (analyzing cases where dangerous jail environment, banging head against
wall, suicide hesitation cuts, weeping and intoxication did not indicate strong like-
lihood that suicide would occur and that only real predictors that courts accept are
evidence of suicide threats or past attempts).
64. See Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1025 n.1 (citing Buffington v. Baltimore County,
913 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1990) and Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also Robertson, supra note 5, at 818 (recounting case
where even though custodial officials knew of detainee's suicidal tendencies, custo-
dians were not found liable because no evidence existed to discount their testi-
mony denying knowledge).
65. See Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1025 (quoting Monmouth County Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)) (distinguishing tort law,
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cepts, instead choosing to define the level of culpability as "higher than a
negligent failure to protect from self-inflicted harm. '66
In addition to the standard for individual liability, Colburn II articu-
lated the standard for municipal liability in cases dealing with a claim for
failure to train governmental employees. 67 Colburn II defined the stan-
dard as "deliberate indifference" to an inmate's constitutional rights
where "the identified deficiency in the training program must be closely
related to the ultimate injury."6 8 In the context of jail suicide under Sec-
tion 1983, the court articulated that a plaintiff has to "(1) identify specific
training not provided that could reasonably be expected to prevent the
suicide that occurred, and (2) must demonstrate that the risk reduction
associated with the proposed training is so great and so obvious that.., it
can reasonably be attributed to a deliberate indifference." 6 9
After it decided Colburn I and Colburn II, the Third Circuit further
defined "deliberate indifference" in Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel. 70 Whetzel is a
case involving prisoners, specifically former female residents of a state ju-
venile detention center, who brought an Eighth Amendment claim under
Section 1983.7 1 The court, partly basing its reasoning on Farmer, held that
"deliberate indifference" refers to a situation in which a custodial official
both knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's health or
safety.7 2 In addition, Whetzel also held that the "deliberate indifference"
standard does not include the element that the official "should have
known." 73
Even though cases like Farmer and Whetzel do not control the Third
Circuit's analysis in Section 1983 pretrial detainee suicide cases, the Third
Circuit's most recent decision relied heavily on Supreme Court and Third
Circuit court precedents that interpreted Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence.7 4 Despite the fact that a pretrial detainee's Section 1983 claim
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth, the Third
66. See id. at 1024 (recognizing that neither Fourteenth Amendment nor
Eighth Amendment impose liability for mere negligence).
67. See id. at 1028 (defining standard).
68. See id. (requiring plaintiff asserting failure to train claim to prove that
specific deficiency in training caused constitutional violation).
69. See id. at 1029-30 (articulating more definite standard for prison suicide
cases).
70. 256 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2001).
71. See id. at 130 (alleging that plaintiff suffered sexual assaults by one of de-
fendants while incarcerated at juvenile facility).
72. See id. at 133 (instructing that defendants in Section 1983 case can
counter claim of "deliberate indifference" in two ways: either establish that their
knowledge did not rise to level of "deliberate indifference" or even if they did
know, they attempted to prevent harm via reasonable actions).
73. See id. (reciting what is not included in standard).
74. See Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005)
(discussing how in Farmer, Supreme Court defined more precisely "deliberate in-
difference" and how Third Circuit in Whetzel further defined that standard).
1144 [Vol. 51: p. 1133
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/7
Circuit in Woloszyn announced that this reliance is permissible. 75 The reli-
ance is permissible because the Third Circuit's "[Section] 1983 jurispru-
dence, in custodial suicides, borrows the term 'deliberate indifference'
from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."76 In Woloszyn, the Third Circuit
posited that "deliberate indifference" might be similar to the "should have
known" element in Section 1983 jurisprudence. 7 7 Even though the Third
Circuit announced this possible connection between the two terms, similar
to past cases, it decided that it did not need to reconcile the differences
between "deliberate indifference," "reckless indifference" and "should
have known."
78
III. THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN WOLOSZYN V. LAWRENCE COUNTY
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
OnJuly 21, 1999, police arrested Richard Lee Woloszyn ("Woloszyn")
after he attempted to burglarize a home and brought him to the Ellwood
City Police Station. 79 After arraignment, two police officers drove Wolos-
zyn to the Lawrence County Correctional Facility. 80 In an Incident Investi-
gation Report, Officer List, an officer who drove Woloszyn to the police
station, wrote that Woloszyn was in "good spirits and was joking" and that
he did not exhibit any signs of depression.
8 1
Correctional Officer Hartman-Swanson interviewed Woloszyn at his
booking, and indicated in her affidavit that he was "very remorseful and
distant," kept talking about "how he had failed as a father" and was happy
75. See id. (discussing why adoption of term from Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence was permissible).
76. See id. (noting how in Whetzel court basically borrowed "deliberate indif-
ference" definition from Supreme Court's Farmer decision but "placed a gloss" on
it).
77. See id. ("'[D]eliberate indifference' may be equivalent to the 'should have
known' element required for § 1983 liability under the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to Colburn I and II.").
78. See id. (deciding that because plaintiff in case could not prove that pretrial
detainee had particular vulnerability to suicide that first two requirements of Col-
burn land Colburn II were not met, thus, court did not need to differentiate terms
because plaintiff never got to third requirement).
79. See id. at 316 (indicating that at police station, Woloszyn voluntarily waived
his right to counsel and gave statement admitting that he attempted to rob resi-
dence in Ellwood City, Pennsylvania).
80. See id. (noting that Officer List and Lieutenant Gilchrist spoke with
Woloszyn).
81. See id. (detailing contents of conversation between officers and Woloszyn).
Woloszyn indicated during the conversation that he was cheating on his wife with a
neighbor and that if they had a gun in his house, his wife probably "would have
shot him years ago." See id. (noting that in response to Woloszyn's statements
about cheating on his wife, one officer replied that Woloszyn "better watch [be-
cause] his wife might kick his butt"). After the officer's statement, Woloszyn re-
plied "[M]aybe that [his wife shooting him] might have been the best thing for
everybody." See id. (quoting Officer List as replying not to talk like that).
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they caught him because "he wanted it to stop."82 As a result, she recom-
mended that Woloszyn be held in the booking area rather than in a jail
cell; however, the officers placed him in a jail cell and allegedly checked
him every five minutes. 83 After Hartman-Swanson's observations, Nurse
Houck interviewed Woloszyn and reported to the captain on duty that
even though she did not believe he was suicidal, they should check him
hourly.8 4 Other officers on duty also reported that they observed nothing
unusual about Woloszyn's behavior and he was subsequently placed in
Housing Unit B ("HB Unit"). 85
Despite the aforementioned observations by correctional officers,
Wayne Shaftic, an inmate in the cell next to Woloszyn's, reported that
Woloszyn "requested a counselor . . . [and] was yelling, screaming, and
kicking for more than 45 minutes, but that no one responded."86 At 8:52
p.m., Officer Graziani found Woloszyn hanging in his cell and called a
code blue.8 7 Two officers arrived at the scene and began performing
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") while another officer went to find
the protective breathing mask that was supposed to be kept in the HB
Unit, but was missing.8 8 Although officers initially inserted the breathing
82. See id. at 316-17 (reporting Hartman-Swanson's affidavit that Woloszyn was
on "24 hour rampage," had done multiple drugs from heroin to crack and that
Woloszyn told her he was not suicidal).
83. See id. at 317 (declaring that after Hartman-Swanson's recommendation,
Nurse Annette Houck, nurse on-duty, cleared Woloszyn for "Housing Unit B,"
which is where prisoners are observed before being placed in general jail
population).
84. See id. (reciting observations from Nurse Houck's report that Woloszyn be
checked for "alcohol withdrawal"). The nurse also questioned Woloszyn about his
psychiatric history and asked whether he needed to see a counselor and Woloszyn
responded that he was not being treated and he did not need to see a therapist.
See id. (asserting that as result of her conversation with him, Nurse Houck did not
believe Woloszyn would harm himself).
85. See id. (describing two officers' statements, Officer Sainato and Officer
Graziani, that Woloszyn's mood or behavior was not unusual, that Woloszyn was
able to "state and spell his name" and that Woloszyn requested juice as drink he
wanted in morning).
86. See id. (quoting inmate's unsworn statement). The inmate also stated that
when Woloszyn requested a counselor he was told to "go to his cell, 'lay it down'
and they would contact a counselor in the morning." See id. at 317-18 (same). The
inmate continued to report that "[Woloszyn] said he needed help, he didn't be-
long here .... I hear the kid in the cell going nuts, yelling and screaming and
punching the metal top bunk." See id. at 318 (same). As per the officer's reactions
to Woloszyn, the inmate was quoted as saying, "[t]he guard at the desk all of this
time . . . was looking thru vacation brochures .... That day Graziani never even
looked in our cells .... He walked past us, went to the end, turned around and
walked past us a second time." See id. (same).
87. See id. (reporting that prisoners in HB Unit were supposed to be checked
every thirty minutes and that Officer Graziani started one round at 8:14 p.m., en-
ded at 8:20 p.m. and on another round found Woloszyn at 8:52 p.m.).
88. See id. (detailing how Officers Graziani and Stiles first propped Woloszyn
on his bed to alleviate pressure on his neck, untied sheet around his neck, checked
his pulse and took alternating turns performing CPR even though there was no
protective breathing mask available at time).
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mask incorrectly, it was finally corrected and the officers continued CPR
until the ambulance arrived to take Woloszyn to the hospital, where he
eventually died.8 9
Patricia Woloszyn, Woloszyn's widow, filed a Section 1983 and wrong-
ful death action against Lawrence County; William Hall, the warden of
Lawrence County Correctional Facility; and Officer Graziani, claiming vio-
lations of Woloszyn's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.90 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's
widow appealed, arguing that summary judgment was incorrect for two
reasons.9 ' First, she claimed that the district court erred because Officer
Graziani failed to make five-minute checks on Woloszyn and failed to have
the breathing mask in the HB unit.92 Second, she alleged that the sum-
mary judgment in favor of Lawrence County and Warden Hall was incor-
rect because the correctional facility "failed to have adequate policies,
procedures and training in place."
93
B. Third Circuit's Analysis
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for Officer Graziani, Lawrence County and Warden Hall. 94 The
court began its analysis with an overview of Supreme Court and Third Cir-
89. See id. (presenting events of incident). Hartman-Swanson, one of the first
officers to observe Woloszyn on in-take, arrived at the scene of the incident and
noticed that the mask was turned backwards, thus, not getting any air into Wolos-
zyn, and reported that she turned the mask around. See id. at 318 n.3 (reporting
Hartman-Swanson's statement from her affidavit). Officer Graziani, however, re-
ported in his deposition that he was the one that corrected the mask's position. See
id. (reporting Graziani's statement from his deposition).
90. See id. at 318-19 ("To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff 'must allege
both a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was com-
mitted by one acting under color of state law.'" (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d
682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997))). A claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is applica-
ble to pretrial detainees because pretrial detainees have not been convicted of any
crime, and thus, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from imposing
punishment on them. See id. at 319 n.5 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
(1979)). Although an Eighth Amendment claim is not applicable in this situation,
the Third Circuit announced that in developing pretrial detainee suicide jurispru-
dence, the court relied on Eighth Amendment cases because "the due process
rights of pretrial detainees are at least as great as the Eight Amendment rights of
convicted and sentenced prisoners." See id. at 319-20 n.5 (citing Boring v.
Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1987)).
91. See id. at 319 (asserting that defendants denied all liability).
92. See id. (listing Woloszyn's widow's arguments on appeal).
93. See id. (listing arguments of Woloszyn's widow on appeal). To overcome
summary judgment on appeal, the plaintiff "must introduce more than a scintilla
of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See id. (quoting Col-
burn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1020 (3d Cir. 1991)).
94. See id. at 326 (stating holding).
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cuit precedent and the standards that developed as a result.95 Even
though the claim in this case relied on a Section 1983 violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court based its reasoning on Eighth Amend-
ment Supreme Court precedent because it held that pretrial detainees'
due process rights are at least equivalent to the Eighth Amendment rights
of convicted prisoners. 9 6 Moreover, despite the Third Circuit's apparent
adoption of the Colburn I test, it refused to distinguish once again between
"deliberate indifference" and "reckless indifference" or adequately define
what "should have known" means.97 The Third Circuit reasoned that the
plaintiff in this case did not establish that Woloszyn had a "particular vul-
nerability" to suicide. 98 Therefore, she did not meet the first criteria
under Colburn I and, thus, the court did not have to more adequately de-
fine the proper standard.9 9
Although the court held that the plaintiffs case did not meet the first
criterion of Colburn I, it still analyzed the liability of Officer Graziani, Law-
rence County and Warden Hall. 100 First, regarding Officer Graziani, the
court reasoned that the evidence that Mrs. Woloszyn proffered did not
demonstrate "a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-
inflicted harm [would] occur." 10 1 To further support her claim, Mrs.
Woloszyn presented Hartman-Swanson's affidavit in which Officer Grazi-
ani was quoted as saying, " [Woloszyn's suicide] was no big thing, it was just
another druggy."10 2 The court concluded that this statement, although
"callous and unsympathetic," did not establish Officer Graziani's knowl-
95. See id. at 319 (noting that Colburn Iwas first time Third Circuit dealt with
Section 1983 liability for pretrial detainee suicide). For a further discussion of
Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent regarding Section 1983 liability for a
pretrial detainee's suicide, see supra notes 29-78 and accompanying text.
96. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 319-20 n.5 (citing Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d
468, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1987)) (reasoning that it has not been decided whether pre-
trial detainees should receive not only equivalent protection but more protection
than convicted prisoners). For a further discussion of the distinction between pre-
trial detainees and convicted prisoners, see supra notes 10-11, 43-44 and accompa-
nying text.
97. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 321 (stating that Third Circuit does not have to
reconcile terms "deliberate indifference" and "should have known").
98. See id. ("We need not attempt to reconcile those two phrases here because
there is no evidence on this record that Woloszyn had a particular vulnerability to
suicide.").
99. See id. ("Accordingly, his wife can not establish the first element under
Colburn land [ Colburn] I.").
100. See id. at 322-26 (analyzing liability). For a further discussion of the
court's analysis with respect to the liability of Officer Graziani, Lawrence County
and Warden Hall, see infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
101. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 322-23 (reasoning that Mrs. Woloszyn misinter-
preted record because Woloszyn was not under any five-minute suicide checks be-
cause, even though Hartman-Swanson recommended them on intake, Nurse
Houck felt they were not necessary).
102. See id. at 323 (quoting Hartman-Swanson's affidavit, which quotes Grazi-
ani as saying that he was supposed to do five-minute checks but never did them).
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CASEBRIEF
edge of Woloszyn's possible vulnerability to commit suicide.10 3 The court
concluded that the only statement that could indicate Officer Graziani
knew of Woloszyn's possible vulnerability to suicide was the unsworn state-
ment of Woloszyn's neighbor-inmate Shaftic.10 4 The Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision to exclude this evidence on the basis
that it was not in affidavit form and thus was not reliable. 10 5 Mrs. Wolos-
zyn's final argument as to Officer Graziani's liability was that he failed "to
maintain a breathing mask in a proper location." 10 6 The court, however,
concluded that not only was it not Officer Graziani's duty to maintain the
breathing mask in the unit, but also that he completely disregarded his
own health when he initiated CPR without the breathing mask.1 0 7 Moreo-
ver, the court concluded that even if it was Officer Graziani's duty to keep
the breathing mask in the area, there was no proof that it would have
prevented Woloszyn's death. l0 8
Second, Mrs. Woloszyn argued that Lawrence County was liable be-
cause it failed to train employees and to provide "readily available" breath-
ing masks. 10 9 The Third Circuit held that although Mrs. Woloszyn's
expert testified to training deficiencies at the jail, he did not identify the
specific training the personnel should have received to recognize that
Woloszyn was suicidal. 110 Regarding the allegation that the city failed to
103. See id. (arguing that only thing judge or jury could deduce from state-
ment was that Graziani was supposed to be checking on Woloszyn, not that Wolos-
zyn was suicidal).
104. See id. (noting that Mrs. Woloszyn's counsel could not obtain sworn state-
ment from inmate Shaftic because he was either fugitive or released from jail, al-
though it is unclear which one).
105. See id. (noting that unsworn statement does not satisfy Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e)). The Third Circuit discussed how Mrs. Woloszvn's counsel
filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) motion to prevent the entry of sum-
mary judgment claiming that the inmate's affidavit was unattainable. See id. (dis-
cussing that counsel asked court not to grant defendant's motion for summary
judgment because counsel could not locate inmate to get his sworn statement). In
denying the Rule 56(f) motion, the district court emphasized that the statement
was over three years old. See id. (discussing district court's ruling). The Third
Circuit noted that in the current case, Mrs. Woloszyn did not claim that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the motion and she also did not claim that
she could have located and deposed the inmate Shaftic. See id. at 324 (discussing
Mrs. Woloszyn's arguments).
106. See id. (arguing this was independent basis for denying summary
judgment).
107. See id. (rendering court's decision).
108. See id. (indicating that mask's unavailability is immaterial because no
proof was proffered that had it been present, Woloszyn would have survived if it
was used immediately and properly).
109. See id. (claiming that failure to train resulted in employees not having
ability to identify and prevent suicide).
110. See id. at 325 (identifying alleged training deficiencies such as facility not
having proper intake documents, facility lacking policy about where to place sui-
cidal prisoners, staff lacking qualifications to assess and prevent suicide and as-
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provide readily available breathing masks or proper training on how to use
them, the court reasoned that because the officers began CPR immedi-
ately, the fact that the breathing mask was initially absent was irrelevant.11 1
Finally, Mrs. Woloszyn claimed that Warden Hall was individually lia-
ble because he failed to "implement proper training, policies and proce-
dure."1 12 To establish Warden Hall's liability, Mrs. Woloszyn relied again
on her expert's testimony about training deficiencies, which was similar to
the testimony used against Lawrence County.11 3 The Third Circuit held
that even if these deficiencies existed, it was irrelevant because she did not
allege what type of training would have forewarned the officers of Wolos-
zyn's impending suicide. 114
IV. PREDICTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. The Third Circuit Will Likely Choose the "Deliberate Indifference" Standard
In several cases that specifically addressed Section 1983 liability for a
pretrial detainee suicide, the Third Circuit has declined to distinguish be-
tween "reckless indifference," "deliberate indifference" and "should have
known." 115 The Third Circuit declined to do this because the plaintiffs
did not meet the first element of proving a particular vulnerability to sui-
cide and, thus, the third element of the Colburn I test never became an
issue. 1 6 When faced with this issue, however, the Third Circuit will most
likely rule that "deliberate indifference," rather than "reckless indiffer-
ence," is the proper standard.' 17 The Third Circuit will also most likely
define "deliberate indifference" as a custodial official having knowledge of
111. See id. at 325-26 (noting that Mrs. Woloszyn's expert testified that Law-
rence County's failure to train employees resulted in mask not being available
when needed and employees not being able to use it properly when needed).
112. See id. at 326 (discussing Warden Hall's liability as warden of facility and
indicating that he can be personally liable under Section 1983).
113. See id. (referring to affidavit that was previously entered on record as
proof of Lawrence County's liability).
114. See id. (comparing liability of Warden Hall to liability of Lawrence
County).
115. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. ("Colburn I'), 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d
Cir. 1991) ("In Colburn I, we referred to 'reckless indifference' as the standard for
judging the defendant's conduct. In Williams, we referred to 'deliberate indiffer-
ence.' Both panels expressly declined to distinguish or precisely define these two
concepts. We find it unnecessary to do so in this case.") (citations omitted). For a
further discussion of Third Circuit cases where the court chose not to define the
standard, see supra notes 53-69, 74-78 and accompanying text.
116. See Wotoszyn, 396 F.3d at 321 ("[W]e need not attempt to reconcile those
two phrases here because there is no evidence on this record that Woloszyn had a
particular vulnerability to suicide."). For a further discussion of Third Circuit
cases that articulated why the court chose not to define the standard, see supra
notes 53-69, 74-78 and accompanying text.
117. For a further discussion of why the "deliberate indifference" standard
will be adopted by the Third Circuit, see infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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a pretrial detainee's particular vulnerability to suicide and affirmatively
disregarding it.1 18
The first reason why the Third Circuit will likely adopt the "deliberate
indifference" standard is because the court admitted that when it previ-
ously used the undefined term "deliberate indifference," the court bor-
rowed the term from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 1 9 In Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Third Circuit has already defined "delib-
erate indifference" as a prison official knowing of and disregarding "an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety."1 2 0 Thus, because the Third Cir-
cuit admitted that it borrowed the term, it will most likely adhere to the
same meaning when it finally chooses to define the term in Section 1983
pretrial detainee suicide cases. 121
Second, the Third Circuit has used the term "deliberate indifference"
interchangeably with "reckless indifference" on many occasions. 12 2 Thus,
the official adoption of "deliberate indifference" would not seem ex-
traordinary given its recurrent appearance in Third Circuit cases. 1 23 Fi-
nally, the Third Circuit will most likely adopt the "deliberate indifference"
standard because it has become the trend in the law. 124 The Supreme
Court and several circuit courts of appeal have adopted this standard, in-
cluding the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits.1
2 5
118. For a further discussion of why the "deliberate indifference" standard
will be defined this way, see infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
119. See Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 321 (discussing how in Whetzel, Third Circuit
defined "deliberate indifference" and how Section 1983 jurisprudence borrowed
"deliberate indifference" from cases like Whetzel); see also Colburn II, 946 F.2d at
1024 (citing Eighth Amendment Supreme Court cases such as Estelle that have
"fashioned the standard of Section 1983 liability in detainee suicide cases").
120. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing
that custodial officials "must know" and that "should have known" standard is not
sufficient).
121. Cf Woloszyn, 396 F.3d at 321 (theorizing that because "deliberate indif-
ference" was adopted from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that it could be
equivalent to "should have known" element under Section 1983). But cf Colburn
II, 946 F.2d at 1025 (defining "should have known" as something more than negli-
gence but something less than knowing risk, which is different from "deliberate
indifference" because "deliberate indifference" requires knowledge of risk).
122. See, e.g., Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023-24 (referring to standard of liability
on numerous occasions as "reckless or deliberate indifference"); see also Williams v.
Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 464 n.10 (3d Cir. 1989) (using "reckless"
and "deliberate indifference" interchangeably).
123. For a further discussion of when "deliberate indifference" has been used
interchangeably with "reckless indifference," see supra notes 58-59, 122 and accom-
panying text.
124. See, e.g., Franks, supra note 10, at 123 ("The First Circuit, in Manarite v.
City of Springfield, effectively described the deliberate indifference standard in jail
suicide cases under Section 1983. This standard is followed by all the circuits, ei-
ther directly or indirectly.").
125. For a further discussion of the cases in the other circuit courts of appeal
that have adopted this standard, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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B. Suggestions for Third Circuit Practitioners
If the Third Circuit adopts the "deliberate indifference" standard,
practitioners in the Third Circuit will have an increasingly difficult time
proving Section 1983 liability. 126 One of the only factors that is relatively
determinative of "deliberate indifference" is a pretrial detainee's prior sui-
cide attempt(s). 127 If a custodial official or governmental entity knows of
past suicide attempts, present suicide threats or a diagnosis of suicidal ten-
dencies and does not affirmatively act to monitor the prisoner, this could
be one factor evidencing "deliberate indifference." 12 8 Because most in-
take screening includes questions regarding a pretrial detainee's history of
mental illness or suicide, records exist to demonstrate both the official's
and the jail's awareness.] 29
Neither a custodial official nor a governmental entity will be held lia-
ble for a detainee's suicide if those attempts are too far in the past or if the
official orjail took necessary precautions to prevent the suicide.13 0 Failure
to take preventative measures, such as asking the detainee about past sui-
126. See also Franks, supra note 10, at 121 ("Plaintiffs usually do not prevail in
jail suicide cases based on [S]ection 1983 .... ").
127. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 816 (noting that previous suicide attempts
or threats are only indicators that court takes into account when finding that custo-
dial official acted with "deliberate indifference").
128. See id. (quoting Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540, 1544-45 (11th
Cir. 1992)) ("In the absence of a previous threat of or an earlier attempt at suicide,
we know of no federal court that has concluded that official conduct in failing to
prevent a suicide constitutes deliberate indifference."); see also Fahey, supra note 5,
at 87 ("In the absence of previous suicide attempts or a medical diagnosis of sui-
cidal tendencies, a plaintiff must establish that an inmate's suicidal tendencies
were so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the need for medical
treatment."). Fahey described one particular case where "deliberate indifference"
was found. See id. at 90 (describing case of Lewis v. Parish of Terrebonne, 894 F.2d
142 (5th Cir. 1990)). The inmate in Lewis, after being arrested, told the nurse and
jail warden that he wanted to die and that he swallowed a number of pills. See id.
(describing case). He was transferred to a local hospital where the psychiatrist on
staff diagnosed him as suicidal, wrote instructions down for the warden and placed
them in an envelope for him. See id. (same). The warden never opened the envel-
ope and, thus, never read the instructions and the inmate committed suicide. See
id. (same). The Fifth Circuit held that the warden knew or should have known
that the inmate expressed a suicidal wish, that the inmate took the pills and that
the inmate was brought to a hospital. See id. (same). Thus, the court held that the
warden acted with "indifferen[ce] to the serious medical needs of the plaintiff."
See id. (same).
129. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at 1251-52 (noting that intake records could
lead jury to believe that ifjail knows about previous suicide attempts, and does not
act accordingly, that constitutes "deliberate indifference"). But cf Robertson,
supra note 5, at 817-18 (noting case where police knew of inmate's several bizarre
suicide attempts and yet court granted summary judgment for defendant because
no evidence existed to disprove defendant's statement denying knowledge of sui-
cide attempts).
130. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 818-19 (citing two cases where courts held
that even though jailers knew of inmate's attempted suicides that occurred two
years prior, attempts were not predictive of present suicide because attempts were
too remote in time).
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cidal attempts, however, is only deemed mere negligence, and does not
rise to the level of "deliberate indifference." 13 1 In addition to past suicide
attempts, the practitioner in the Third Circuit might also be able to prove
"deliberate indifference" if the jail has a history of inmate suicides and has
not developed procedures to prevent them.1
3 2
For a practitioner representing the custodial officials or governmental
entities, defending them is not a difficult task.13 3 So long as there is not
gross or blatant disregard for an inmate's health, no liability will be
found. 134 To bolster the defense's case, the practitioner should provide
evidence of the following: 1) the municipality's adequate training and su-
pervision in suicide detection and prevention; 2) policies and procedures
for screening potential suicide victims such as questions regarding use of
alcohol, drugs and hospitalization for suicide; 3) policies and procedures
for monitoring potential suicide victims; 4) sufficient inmate searches and
removal of dangerous items, such as shoe laces and belts; and 5) continu-
ous inspections of the cell area.
1 3 5
V. CONCLUSION
Even though suicide in jails is common, the heightened standard of
"deliberate indifference" is necessary. 13 6 It is crucial to comport with the
Supreme Court's holding that mere negligence is not enough to prove a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation. 13 7 Moreover, it is also cru-
cial because, given the lack of adequate staffing in jails and the overcrowd-
ing of prisons, it is practically impossible to monitor every single instance
131. See id. at 818 ("Courts have also refused to impose liability because jailers
neglected to make inquiries about suicidal tendencies."); see also Franks, supra note
10, at 132 (noting that jail administrators are in difficult situation because if they
screen and do so ineffectively or if pretrial detainee is identified suicidal but jail
does not prevent suicide, jail administrators are worse off than had they not
screened at all).
132. See Fahey, supra note 5, at 95 (highlighting Third Circuit case where city
knew of large number of suicides, but did not take measures to prevent them and,
thus,' was held to have been acting deliberately indifferent).
133. See, e.g., id. at 91 (citing very few cases where "deliberate indifference"
was found and arguing that winning Section 1983 suicide case is difficult).
134. See id. (citing only few cases that found "deliberate indifference").
135. See id. at 95 (listing several recommendations that officials could use to
help decrease suicide rate in jail); see also Franks, supra note 10, at 131-32 (arguing
that jail personnel should be required to screen detainees for mental health sta-
tus);Johnson, supra note 5, at 1257 (proposing that evaluations should absolutely
be conducted to ascertain detainee's mental health history and that qualified jail
personnel should be on staff to diagnose suicidal tendencies).
136. See generally Fahey, supra note 5 (arguing throughout paper that courts
have correctly declined to allow Section 1983 claims when mere negligence is al-
leged and that proper standard is heightened standard of "deliberate
indifference").
137. For a further discussion of Supreme Court cases holding that negligence
is an inadequate standard, see supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
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of potential suicidal behavior.1 3 8 As a result of this and prior Third Cir-
cuit and other circuit court precedent, the Third Circuit will most likely
adopt the "deliberate indifference" standard for Section 1983 pretrial de-
tainee jail suicides. 13 9 This will be the correct decision because even quali-
fied mental health professionals frequently disagree about whether a
person is suicidal; so a custodial official, not adequately trained in the
area, could not reasonably be expected to identify an inmate who is any-
thing but blatantly suicidal. 1 40
Shevon L. Scarafile
138. See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 5, at 79 (reporting that in municipal and
county jails, overcrowding and "antiquated structures" make it easier for inmates
to commit suicide). But see Franks, supra note 10, at 131-33 (arguing that some
suicides are preventable if effective screening and training policies are
implemented).
139. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit will most likely adopt
this standard, see supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text.
140. SeeJohnson, supra note 5, at 1251 (noting that if suicidal tendency is not
sufficiently obvious and mental health professionals would even disagree, that
courts may not impose liability); see also Fahey, supra note 5, at 89 (arguing that
hindsight is 20-20 and thus finding person at fault or to blame is easy after fact).
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